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Chapter 19 
Summary and Conclusions 
19.1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has studied the phenomenon of tax information asymmetries between 
the taxable person and his transaction counterpart in the context of EU VAT. This 
final part of the thesis (Part VI) provides an overview of the conclusions of the 
thesis, additionally producing a summary which recaptures the primary research 
findings. 
The following section (19.2) provides a concise overview of the most important 
conclusions of the research. Subsequently, sections 19.3 to 19.6 contain the con-
clusions for each of the four research questions of the thesis. Finally, Chapter 20 
translates the academic outcomes of the thesis into concrete reflections, as well as 
recommendations for taxable persons, the (EU) legislator, and academia. 
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19.2. CENTRAL CONCLUSIONS 
The first central conclusion of the thesis is that horizontal tax information asym-
metries between the taxable person and his transaction counterpart are a real pos-
sibility with regard to positive EU VAT law. For the purposes of taxation, the 
taxable person depends to a considerable extent on tax information held by others. 
At the same time, EU VAT law provides him with no adequate instruments, legal 
or other, to resolve asymmetries or prevent their materialization. Instead, the taxa-
ble person is expected to arrange the procurement of external tax information on 
the basis of his commercial interaction with his transaction counterparts. To obtain 
access to the tax information, he may have to rely on his bargaining power and the 
willingness of these transaction counterparts to cooperate. In that regard, the pro-
curement of tax information can by no means be regarded as an infallible process, 
as it may be frustrated by commercial conflicts, limitations of confidentiality or 
privacy, and other interferences. Additionally, in case the disclosure of tax infor-
mation indeed becomes a commercial bargaining item, it may influence other as-
pects of the respective transaction (e.g. price or delivery terms). Such an outcome 
implies a violation of neutrality.  
The second central conclusion of the thesis is that in the field of (EU) VAT, 
the actual materialization of a horizontal tax information asymmetry has a disrup-
tive impact on taxation. An asymmetry may give rise to adversities such as double 
taxation, non-taxation, accumulation of VAT, differential VAT treatments of simi-
lar transactions, adverse selection, and other market inefficiencies. In addition, an 
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Figure 19.1.A. Research structure overview 
+ Exploration of appropriate law 
+ Exploration of appropriate law 
Part I: Introduction 
 = Already discussed part 
= Current part 
  = To be discussed part 
  
Part IV: Legal implications of horizontal 
tax information asymmetries 
E.g. which legal implications do and should 
exist for the taxable person? 
Part V: Occurrence of horizontal tax 
information asymmetries 
E.g. does EU VAT law imply the risk of 
asymmetries for the taxable person? 
Part II: Conceptual framework 
E.g. what is tax information, what is 
a tax information asymmetry? 
Part III: Legal framework 
E.g. why does the taxable person 
need tax information from other 
parties? 
Summary and Conclusions 
477 
asymmetry may imply that the taxable person is confronted with legal implications 
(i.e. material VAT corrections, sanctions) which cannot be justified when taking 
into account the legal principles inherent in the system of EU VAT. Further to 
this, the imposition of material VAT corrections and sanctions should ideally be 
based on a balanced weighing of the legal principles against the backdrop of the 
factual circumstances at hand. Following the principle of fiscal neutrality, an 
asymmetry should not have legal implications (i.e. material VAT corrections) for 
the taxable person in case their imposition leads to the application of VAT contra-
ry to the objective characteristics of the underlying transaction, or in case the taxa-
ble person is unable to transfer the burden of VAT to the final consumer. With 
regard to the principle of legitimate expectations (as the corollary of the principle 
of legal certainty), an asymmetry should not lead to material VAT corrections for 
the taxable person in case that person, while being subject to the asymmetry, has 
relied on legitimate expectations in the course of taxation. Additionally, the princi-
ple of legal simplicity and effectiveness opposes material VAT corrections when 
the asymmetries that have caused their imposition are effectively the consequence 
of obligations which have, to an unreasonable extent, complicated the application 
of VAT by the taxable person. Finally, the principle of proportionality opposes the 
imposition of material VAT corrections and sanctions on the taxable person in 
case he has acted in good faith and has done everything which could reasonably be 
expected from him to resolve the asymmetry or prevent its materialization. 
The third central conclusion of the thesis is that both the disruptive effect of 
asymmetries and the tax information dependencies of the taxable person call for a 
reconsideration of the tax information position of the taxable person in EU VAT. 
Following current positive EU VAT law, tax information obligations (i.e. admin-
istration and disclosure requirements) are almost exclusively imposed on the taxable 
person who is held to apply VAT as the subject of taxation. If this one-sided reli-
ance on the taxable person is to be maintained, he should ideally not be expected to 
procure external tax information to which he has no efficient access. In this regard, 
(rebuttable) presumptions may be employed to alleviate the tax information posi-
tion of the taxable person. Another option to counter the materialization of asym-
metries is to revise the current distribution of tax information obligations between 
the taxable person, his transaction counterparts, and the national public authorities. 
If we accept that tax information is indeed indispensable for taxation, it should 
ideally be procured and administrated by the party who, in all reasonability, has the 
most efficient access to it.  
The above primary conclusions are connected to a range of other research find-
ings which the thesis has established throughout the various phases of the re-
search. These are discussed in the following subsections of this chapter. 
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19.3. PART II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Since all research questions employ concepts which are alien to positive EU VAT 
law (e.g. tax information, asymmetry), the thesis required a conceptual framework. 
Following the introduction (Part I), Part II of the thesis provided, partly on the 
basis of the information sciences, the necessary concepts and their definitions. The 
thesis defined tax information as information which is necessary for the design, im-
plementation, application, administration, supervision, and enforcement of a tax. In 
the context of the thesis, tax information consists of information related to the 
actual object and subject of taxation, which is required for the application and ad-
ministration of the tax by the taxable person. A tax information asymmetry is defined as 
a situation in which one party has (or can access) tax information that another party 
does not have (or cannot access) but which is required by the latter, possibly in a 
specific form, in the course of taxation. 
19.4. PART III: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Part III explored the legal origin of horizontal tax information asymmetries be-
tween the taxable person and his transaction counterpart in the specific context of 
EU VAT. The reason for this research process is that all four research questions of 
the thesis employ the legal position of the taxable person as the perspective from 
which the phenomenon of asymmetries is approached and ultimately researched. 
This demands insight into the manner in which the norms applicable to the taxable 
person may lead to the situation that he finds himself in need of external tax in-
formation.  
The thesis has approached the legal origin of horizontal tax information asym-
metries with regard to the legal nature of VAT and the legal norms of positive EU 
VAT law. As regards the legal nature of EU VAT, the phenomenon of horizontal 
tax information asymmetries can be explained partly by the circumstance that the 
EU VAT system employs the taxable person as a vehicle to impose a VAT burden 
on another person (i.e. the final consumer). Another explanatory factor is the cir-
cumstance that EU VAT aims to burden consumption by taxing transactions, yet 
both consumption and transactions are, at least to some extent, external phenome-
na from the perspective of the taxable person who is held to apply and substantiate 
VAT. Both aspects of the legal nature of EU VAT presuppose, at least to a certain 
extent, horizontal tax information procurement by the taxable person. 
With regard to the norms of positive EU VAT law, the thesis concludes that 
the legal origin of horizontal tax information asymmetries is founded on three 
categories of rules: the substantive norms of taxation, the administration and dis-
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close rules and sanctions. The combination of these three elements is the reason 
that the horizontal exchange of tax information between the taxable person and his 
transaction counterpart is an indispensable element of taxation. The substantive 
norms necessitate the horizontal procurement of tax information for the applica-
tion of VAT by the taxable person. Conversely, the administration and disclosure 
rules necessitate the horizontal procurement of tax information for the substantia-
tion of VAT by the taxable person vis-à-vis the national public authorities, possibly 
with a prescribed form and content. Sanctions attach commitment to the applica-
tion and substantiation of VAT by the taxable person and thus also to the horizon-
tal procurement of tax information. 
With reference to the above, the thesis concludes that the horizontal procure-
ment of tax information by the taxable person is an indispensable part of the cur-
rent EU VAT system. 
19.5. PART IV: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HORIZONTAL 
TAX INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
The purpose of Part IV of the thesis was to address the research questions to what 
extent horizontal tax information asymmetries have legal implications for the taxa-
ble person and to what extent they should have legal implications for the taxable 
person. This section discusses both research questions separately. 
Research question I: To what extent do horizontal tax information asymmetries in the 
field of EU VAT have legal implications for the taxable person? 
The rationale underlying the above research question is that horizontal tax infor-
mation asymmetries are not academically or practically relevant if the taxable per-
son will not face any legal implications following their occurrence. Firstly, the re-
search question demands insight into the categories of legal implications that may 
follow from an asymmetry. As a general implication, the thesis concludes that the 
materialization of an asymmetry causes the taxable person not to apply and sub-
stantiate VAT in line with the objective characteristics of the underlying transac-
tion and the legal requirements. Following this, the national public authorities may 
impose two types of legal implications: material VAT corrections and sanctions. 
Material VAT corrections are imposed if the asymmetry leads the taxable person to 
apply VAT contrary to the objective characteristics of the transaction or if it leaves 
him unable to substantiate his application of VAT. Sanctions are imposed to penal-
ize fiscal conduct when the asymmetry has caused it to be in violation of the legal 
requirements. 
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As a second aspect, the above research question demands insight into the ex-
tent to which the taxable person faces the legal implications associated with the mate-
rialization of an asymmetry. The thesis has established that, as a general rule, the 
legal implications associated with the materialization of a horizontal tax infor-
mation asymmetry (i.e. material VAT corrections, sanctions) are imposed on the 
taxable person who, because of the asymmetry, is unable to apply and substantiate 
VAT in line with the legal requirements and the objective characteristics of the 
underlying transaction. CJEU case law validates the conclusion that it is the taxable 
person acting as the subject of taxation who in first instance bears the material 
burden of VAT in case an asymmetry frustrates the process of taxation; moreover, 
he may also be sanctioned for it.1 Following this, the distribution of the legal im-
plications can be said to be one-sided: generally, neither the transaction counter-
part nor the national public authorities face any legal implications (i.e. the material 
burden of VAT, sanctions) in case a horizontal tax information asymmetry arises.  
There are some nuances to the general rule that the legal implications of asym-
metries are concentrated at the level of the taxable person. Firstly, in a limited num-
ber of situations, the CJEU has provided judgments in which legal implications 
(material VAT corrections) were averted for the taxable person – meaning that the 
national public authorities were required to forfeit their VAT claims.2 In two in-
stances (i.e. Euro Tyre, Teleos and others) the CJEU even ruled that, instead of the 
taxable person, the transaction counterpart should be confronted with the material 
burden of VAT.3 Another nuance is that the taxable person, in a limited number of 
situations, may be able to influence the occurrence and distribution of legal implica-
tions by charging VAT against the standard VAT rate, irrespective of the objective 
characteristics of the underlying transaction. Notwithstanding this, charging VAT is 
not an effective instrument to avoid the legal implications associated with a hori-
zontal tax information asymmetry in case a) the transaction counterpart (customer) 
does not pay the charged VAT to the taxable person effecting the supply, or b) the 
taxable person effecting the supply is unaware of being subject to an asymmetry, or 
c) the asymmetry relates to a determinant for the place of supply or the right of 
                                                     
1 In numerous CJEU cases, the national public authorities initially impose legal implications on the 
taxable person who is subject to an asymmetry, e.g. CJEU, 23 April 2015, C-111/14, GST - Sarviz 
Germania, ECLI:EU:C:2015:267; CJEU, 9 October 2014, C-492/13, Traum, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2267; 
CJEU, 16 December 2010, C-430/09, Euro Tyre Holding, [2010] ECR I-13335; CJEU, 21 February 
2008, C-271/06, Netto Supermarkt, [2008] ECR I-771; CJEU, 27 September 2007, C-409/04, Teleos and 
others, [2007] ECR I-7797; CJEU, 27 September 2007, C-184/05, Twoh International, [2007] ECR I-
7897. 
2 E.g. CJEU, 23 April 2015, C-111/14, GST - Sarviz Germania, ECLI:EU:C:2015:267; CJEU, 9 Octo-
ber 2014, C-492/13, Traum, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2267; CJEU, 21 February 2008, C-271/06, Netto Super-
markt, [2008] ECR I-771; CJEU, 27 September 2007, C-409/04, Teleos and others, [2007] ECR I-7797. 
3 CJEU, 16 December 2010, C-430/09, Euro Tyre Holding, [2010] ECR I-13335; CJEU, 27 September 
2007, C-409/04, Teleos and others, [2007] ECR I-7797. 
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deduction. As an instrument for avoiding the legal implications of asymmetries, the 
charging of (undue) VAT can thus be said to be imperfect. 
Thirdly, the general implication that an asymmetry leads the taxable person to 
misapply and missubstantiate VAT also uncovers the erosive effect of asymmetries 
on the proper functioning of the VAT system. The thesis has established that hori-
zontal tax information asymmetries may imply a differential VAT treatment of 
similar transactions, adverse selection, accumulation of VAT, conflicts with the 
ratio legis of substantive norms, and non-taxation and double taxation. Even 
though these phenomena on their own account do not constitute legal implications 
for the taxable person, they are relevant as they frustrate the neutral application of 
VAT. Further, as regards the missubstantiation of VAT, horizontal tax information 
asymmetries lead to an incorrect, incomplete or even non-existent administrative 
reflection of taxation – thus frustrating the public functions of supervision and 
enforcement. The circumstance that the above phenomena constitute adversities 
with regard to the principles underlying EU VAT simultaneously makes them ar-
guments in support of legal remedies which carry the potential of countering the 
materialization of horizontal tax information asymmetries. The mentioned adversi-
ties validate the conclusion that horizontal tax information asymmetries should be 
countered in any justifiable way possible.4 
The conclusion that the legal implications of asymmetries are generally concen-
trated at the level of the taxable person logically leads one to the question whether 
the imposition of legal implications is justified. The rationale of this question is that 
asymmetries are only academically relevant to the extent that the associated legal 
implications imposed on the taxable person cannot be justified on the basis of the 
norms applicable in EU VAT. Thus, to this end, the thesis has addressed the fol-
lowing research question: 
Research question II: To what extent should horizontal information asymmetries have 
legal implications for the taxable person with regard to the neutrality principle, the principle of 
legal certainty, the principle of legal simplicity and effectiveness, and the principle of 
proportionality? 
In the context of the second research question, the thesis has established that four 
legal principles are recurrently present in CJEU case law and, as such, function as 
the normative foundation for answering the above research question: the principle 
of fiscal neutrality, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of legal simplicity 
and effectiveness, and the principle of proportionality. 
                                                     
4 Chapter 20 contains various recommendations as regards the countering of horizontal tax infor-
mation asymmetries. 
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The thesis has produced the conclusion that the imposition of legal implica-
tions associated with horizontal tax information asymmetry should depend on a 
weighing of the various legal principles against the backdrop of the particular case 
facts at hand. This means not only that each situation is to be judged on its own 
characteristics but also that the legal principles are relative, in the sense that their 
influence on the extent of legal implications is the product of a process of balanced 
weighing. Different circumstances as well as different principles may support a 
different outcome. For example, the principle of fiscal neutrality demands the im-
position of material VAT corrections in case a taxable person, because of an 
asymmetry involving incorrect tax information, has applied an exemption contrary 
to the objective characteristics of the transaction. However, the principle of fiscal 
neutrality may very well be superseded by the legitimate expectations of the taxable 
person (i.e. as an expression of the principle of legal certainty) even when the na-
tional public authorities have initially accepted the authenticity of the incorrect tax 
information. In that situation, the weighing of the principles may lead to an out-
come where legal certainty is given precedence – following which the asymmetry 
should not have any legal implications (i.e. material VAT corrections) for the taxa-
ble person. With regard to their relativity, the thesis has referred to the legal prin-
ciples as vectors. The conclusions of the thesis are discussed below, separately for 
each of the mentioned principles. 
Ad 1: The principle of fiscal neutrality 
As regards the principle of fiscal neutrality, the thesis concludes the following. In 
its legal dimension, the principle demands that transactions are taxed according to 
their objective characteristics. The reason is that similar goods and services, which 
are thus in competition, are not to be treated differently for VAT purposes. Fol-
lowing this, asymmetries should not have legal implications (i.e. material VAT 
corrections) for the taxable person in case their imposition would lead to an appli-
cation of VAT not in line with the objective characteristics of the transaction. This 
is for example the case when the national public authorities deny an application of 
the exemption for an intra-Community supply of goods when the substantive re-
quirements for that exemption have been met, solely on the basis of the fact that 
the supplier is subject to an asymmetry as regards the VAT identification number 
of his customer. In this context, the principle of fiscal neutrality demands that 
asymmetries should not have legal implications (i.e. material VAT corrections) in 
case these asymmetries lead to infringements of a mere formal nature without tak-
ing into account the objective characteristics of the transaction. In the example 
above, the national public authorities should forfeit their VAT claims. 
Conversely, the principle constitutes a vector which supports the imposition of 
material VAT corrections on the taxable person in case that would have the result 
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of an application of VAT in line with the objective characteristics of the transac-
tion. For example, where the taxable person is subject to an asymmetry as regards 
the fact that the actual transport destination of the goods he supplied is within the 
same Member State, the principle of fiscal neutrality, by demanding the same VAT 
treatment of similar and competing goods, supports the imposition of material 
VAT correction when the taxable person has applied the exemption for intra-
Community supplies of goods. Thus, with a specific view to the legal dimension of 
the principle of fiscal neutrality, the extent to which an asymmetry should have 
legal implications for the taxable person depends on whether such legal implica-
tions (i.e. material VAT corrections) carry the potential of achieving taxation in line 
with the objective characteristics of the transaction. 
The principle of fiscal neutrality in its legal dimension also exerts its influence 
when a horizontal tax information asymmetry is ultimately resolved. In that situation, 
the principle as a vector demands that the taxable person is allowed to make 
amendments to his initial application of VAT, without running the risk that the na-
tional public authorities deny these amendments. For example, the principle of fiscal 
neutrality is a vector which demands that transaction counterparts enjoy the oppor-
tunity of correcting VAT which was charged unduly by the taxable person. In this 
regard, the principle bestows a certain flexibility on the system of VAT – as it may 
allow a taxable person to use the ultimately disclosed tax information in order to 
bring the application of VAT in line with the objective characteristics of the transac-
tion. In such instances, the asymmetry thus ultimately should not have any legal im-
plications for the taxable person (i.e. in the form of a denial of the amendments by 
the national public authorities) in case the late tax information allows for the applica-
tion and substantiation of VAT in line with the objective characteristics of the under-
lying transaction. This is only different when precedence is to be given to other vec-
tors; for example, in case reasonable time limits have been exceeded, the principle of 
legal certainty may justify a denial of amendments by the taxable person. 
Notwithstanding the above, the principle of fiscal neutrality also has an eco-
nomic dimension – which supposes that the levy of VAT is proportional to the 
price of the respective good or service. Taking this dimension into account, the 
thesis concludes that the principle of fiscal neutrality is a vector which opposes 
legal implications (i.e. material VAT corrections) for the taxable person in case he 
is unable to transfer the burden of VAT to his transaction counterpart further 
down the supply chain. In case material VAT corrections cannot be imposed on 
those persons on whom the final burden of VAT should indeed rest, the national 
public authorities should forfeit their VAT claims. Nonetheless, if the transaction 
counterpart is a final consumer, and the taxable person effecting the supply is una-
ble to transfer the burden of VAT to that person, the principle in my view sup-
ports, at least theoretically, the imposition of a material VAT correction on the 
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final consumer, as it would achieve a proportional levy of VAT without burdening 
any taxable person within the supply chain.5 Such a situation may for example 
materialize when, in the context of a B2C telecommunications service, the taxable 
person was not able to establish the place of residence of the final consumer due 
to an asymmetry. Finally, the economic dimension of the principle of fiscal neutral-
ity also relates to the area of sanctions. In a situation in which an asymmetry pre-
vents the taxable person from applying and substantiating VAT in line with the 
legal requirements, the principle opposes the imposition of a sanction (fine) which 
essentially constitutes a double levy of VAT, as that violates the proportional levy 
of VAT. 
Finally, the principle of fiscal neutrality constitutes a vector of relevance when 
looking at situations involving asymmetries experienced by the taxable person in 
his capacity as a customer in a transaction. In order to safeguard the neutrality of 
taxation and the proportional levy of VAT, the right of deduction can in principle 
not be limited. Thus, invoices which are issued late should not obstruct the exer-
cise of the right of deduction. Similarly, in case of an incorrect invoice, the princi-
ple of fiscal neutrality (in combination with the principle of proportionality) de-
mands that the gravity of the infringement and the risk of loss of tax revenues for 
the national public authorities are taken into account when establishing the legality 
of legal implications (i.e. a denial of deduction); parties should be provided with 
the possibility of correcting the respective invoice. As regards the right of deduc-
tion, the above validates the conclusion that it is first and foremost a right bestowed 
on the taxable person acting as a customer and not a conditional allowance which 
the national public authorities may deny at their own discretion whenever the 
transaction counterpart (i.e. supplier) has failed to meet his legal obligations in the 
course of taxation. In simple terms, the primary purpose of deduction is to ensure 
the neutral and proportional levy of VAT, not to serve (in the form of a denial of 
deduction) as a sanctioning instrument that safeguards the budgetary interests of 
the national public authorities. Further to this, the denial of deduction may not be 
used to compel the taxable person acting as a customer to take on responsibilities 
which are inherent in the public function of supervision and enforcement. 
Ad 2: The principle of legal certainty 
The principle of legal certainty demands that a legal system and its application 
should be clear and precise, so that individuals may ascertain unequivocally what 
their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly. The thesis con-
cludes that the principle exerts influence on the extent of legal implications in situ-
                                                     
5 Imposing material VAT corrections on final consumers would however constitute a practically 
complex affair; it thus displays an uneasy relation with the principle of legal simplicity and effective-
ness. 
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ations in which the taxable person intends to make amendments to his initial appli-
cation of VAT – e.g. when the horizontal tax information asymmetry is ultimately 
resolved by the disclosure of the necessary tax information. Even though the prin-
ciple of fiscal neutrality is a vector which supports the possibility of amendments – 
as they ultimately allow VAT to be applied in line with the objective characteristics 
of the transaction – the principle of legal certainty can have a directly opposing 
effect. CJEU case law underlines that the application of VAT without any temporal 
limit would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty, as the latter requires the 
tax position of the taxable person not to be open to challenge indefinitely. In other 
words, the taxable person should make amendments within a reasonable time 
frame or otherwise be exposed to the risk that they are denied by the national pub-
lic authorities. With regard to this, the thesis concludes that a horizontal tax infor-
mation asymmetry can and should have legal implications for the taxable person 
(e.g. in the form of the denial of amendments) in case he is unable to resolve it 
within a reasonable time frame. This underlines the relevance of (timely) access to 
external tax information. 
The corollary of the principle of legal certainty is the principle of legitimate ex-
pectations. The latter principle requires that when the conduct of the authorities 
gave rise to a reasonable expectation in the mind of a reasonably prudent econom-
ic agent, the legitimate nature of that expectation must be respected. The thesis 
concludes that the principle of legitimate expectations (as an expression of the 
principle of legal certainty) constitutes a vector which provides that horizontal tax 
information asymmetries should not have legal implications (i.e. material VAT 
corrections) for the taxable person in case that person, while being subject to an 
asymmetry, has relied on legitimate expectations in the course of taxation. This is 
for example the case when the national public authorities initially have accepted 
the tax information (i.e. documentary evidence) used by the taxable person as legit-
imate, while in fact it did not represent the objective characteristics of the underly-
ing transaction. In such instances, the principle of legal certainty (legitimate expec-
tations) may take precedence over the legal dimension of the principle of fiscal 
neutrality (which demands the application of VAT in line with the objective char-
acteristics of VAT) and prohibit the imposition of legal implications on the taxable 
person. If so, the national public authorities should forfeit their VAT claims, to the 
detriment of their own budgetary position. 
Ad 3: The principle of legal simplicity and effectiveness 
The principle of legal simplicity and effectiveness provides that, as a practical ne-
cessity, the system of VAT operates effectively. The application of VAT should 
thus be as simple and uncomplicated as possible; obligations must not, by reason 
of their number or technical nature, render the application and substantiation of 
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VAT practically impossible or excessively difficult. By virtue of its nature, the prin-
ciple of legal simplicity and effectiveness predominantly exerts influence on the 
legality of (national) tax information requirements imposed on the taxable person. 
In this context, the thesis concludes that asymmetries should not have legal impli-
cations for the taxable person in case the asymmetries are effectively the conse-
quence of obligations which have, to an unreasonable extent, complicated the ap-
plication and substantiation of VAT by the taxable person. In connection with the 
right of deduction for example, it is unreasonable to require that the taxable per-
son, in his capacity as a customer, verifies the VAT status of his transaction coun-
terpart (i.e. supplier) and ascertains that the latter has met his obligations as regards 
the declaration and payment of VAT. Such a requirement – which by its very na-
ture belongs to the public function of supervision and enforcement – makes it 
practically impossible, or at least excessively difficult, to exercise the right of de-
duction because it is likely to imply a horizontal tax information asymmetry for the 
taxable person. In such situations, the principle of legal simplicity and effectiveness 
is a vector which opposes the respective (national) tax information requirement 
and thus also the legal implications (e.g. a denial of deduction, sanctions) which are 
imposed on the taxable person who is unable to comply. 
Ad 4: The principle of proportionality 
The principle of proportionality demands that measures must not go beyond what 
is necessary to attain the objective of ensuring the correct collection of the tax; 
they should be appropriate for the legitimate objective that they serve. The thesis 
has illustrated that the principle expresses standards of reasonability, also in con-
nection with the conduct of the taxable person and his transaction counterpart. 
Firstly, the thesis concludes that the principle of proportionality demands that 
asymmetries should not have legal implications (i.e. material VAT corrections) for 
the taxable person in case the asymmetries lead to a mere formal infringement, 
while the material conditions of taxation have been met. In this regard, the princi-
ple of proportionality is a vector which opposes an unreasonably strict and formal-
istic approach to taxation. When the principle is to be given precedence, the na-
tional public authorities should forfeit their VAT claims. This is only different 
when non-compliance with the formality effectively prevents the taxable person 
from establishing that VAT has been applied in line with the objective characteris-
tics of the transaction. 
Another conclusion of the thesis is that the principle of proportionality de-
mands the weighing of the conduct of the taxable person and his transaction coun-
terpart in the course of taxation. There are two primary elements in this regard: the 
good faith of parties and the efforts which they have exerted to resolve the hori-
zontal tax information asymmetry or prevent its materialization. In case a taxable 
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person has acted in good faith and has done everything which could reasonably be 
expected from him to resolve the asymmetry or prevent its materialization, the 
principle of proportionality is a vector which opposes the imposition of legal im-
plications (i.e. material VAT corrections and sanctions) on that person. 
As regards good faith, the thesis concludes that not acting in good faith (i.e. act-
ing in bad faith) is only a relevant factor to be weighed in connection with the legal 
implications of asymmetries in case the national public authorities are exposed to 
the risk of loss of tax revenues. Even though it may lead to calculative behavior on 
the side of the taxable person (i.e. taxable persons may purposefully misclassify 
transactions in case there is no risk of loss of tax revenues), the thesis concludes 
that the CJEU doctrine on this point is justified with regard to the circumstance 
that the national public authorities would otherwise be able to unduly enrich them-
selves at the expense of the taxable person. 
As regards the exerted efforts, the thesis concludes that the taxable person is 
subject to an investigative responsibility in the course of taxation, which is a meas-
ure of the effort he can reasonably be expected to exert in order to procure exter-
nal tax information in support of the application and substantiation of VAT. In 
case the taxable person has done everything which could reasonably be expected 
from him to resolve the asymmetry or prevent its materialization, the principle of 
proportionality constitutes a vector which demands that he should not be con-
fronted with the imposition of legal implications (i.e. material VAT corrections, 
sanctions). The boundaries of the investigative responsibility are by no means 
fixed; they depend on the relevant circumstances at hand which are weighed on 
grounds of reasonability. Signals which are suggestive of different or changed case 
facts generally expand the investigative responsibility of the taxable person; upon 
their receipt, he should exert additional efforts to refute or confirm these signals. 
Further, the investigative responsibility of the taxable person is limited in case the 
taxable person is fully incapacitated as regards the (horizontal) procurement of tax 
information – e.g. when the tax information has been lost following a natural disas-
ter. Additionally, the thesis concludes that the investigative responsibility of the 
taxable person does not go as far as to effectively constitute a transfer of the su-
pervision and enforcement responsibilities of the national public authorities to the 
taxable person. 
In sum, the principle of proportionality opposes the imposition of legal impli-
cations (i.e. material VAT corrections, sanctions) on the taxable person and his 
transaction counterpart in case they have acted in good faith and have done every-
thing which could reasonably be expected from them to resolve the asymmetry or 
prevent its materialization. If both have acted in good faith and have done every-
thing which could reasonably be expected from them, the principle of proportion-
ality is a vector which demands that the national public authorities should not im-
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pose sanctions and should forfeit VAT claims to the detriment of their own budg-
etary position (e.g. when accounts are lost following a natural disaster). Alternately, 
if either the taxable person or his transaction counterpart has not acted in good 
faith and has not done everything which could reasonably expected from him to 
prevent or resolve the asymmetry (e.g. when he neglects to disclose tax infor-
mation or when he intentionally discloses incorrect tax information), the principle 
is a vector which supports the imposition of legal implications (i.e. material VAT 
corrections, sanctions) on that party – as they would serve the legitimate purpose 
of the correct application of VAT. The potency of the principle of proportionality 
in this regard is underlined by the CJEU judgments in Teleos and others and Euro 
Tyre, where the Court denies the imposition of material VAT corrections on the 
taxable person who is subject to a horizontal tax information asymmetry and in-
stead rules that the transaction counterpart should be held liable for VAT in case 
of a contract breach on the latter’s part. 
Focusing on the legal position of the taxable person, the thesis concludes that 
his good faith and his exerted efforts are to be regarded in conjunction with each 
other. Together, they reflect the attitude and conduct which is expected of the 
taxable person with regard to the legitimate interests of the treasury and the prem-
ise that VAT is to be applied and substantiated in line with the objective character-
istics of the transaction and the legal requirements. The weighing of the conduct of 
the taxable person against the backdrop of the principle of proportionality is a 
central factor of influence when determining to what extent asymmetries should 
have legal implications for the taxable person. The reason for this is that it may 
shield the taxable person from the legal implications of asymmetries (i.e. material 
VAT corrections and sanctions) when he ultimately is not able to resolve the hori-
zontal tax information asymmetry or prevent its materialization despite his good 
faith and exerted efforts. By means of its case law, the CJEU thus recognizes the 
possibility that there are circumstances beyond the control of the taxable person, 
for which he is not to be held accountable. For example, a transaction counterpart 
may categorically refuse to disclose tax information or may even mislead the taxa-
ble person with incorrect tax information or a contract breach. In such situations 
of unilateral dependency, the thesis concludes that the principle of proportionality 
is a vector which renders the imposition of legal implications on the taxable person 
disproportionate when the taxable person has acted in good faith and has done 
everything which could reasonably be expected from him to resolve the asymmetry 
or prevent its materialization. In this sense, the case law of the CJEU provides a 
valuable opportunity for taxable persons: if they are willing to act in good faith and 
exert reasonable efforts to achieve a correct application and substantiation of VAT, 
they can count on a certain extent of legal protection when the process of taxation 
is ultimately frustrated by horizontal tax information asymmetries. 
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Further to the first research question, the thesis has concluded that the taxable 
person may influence the extent to which horizontal tax information asymmetries 
have legal implications, i.e. by charging VAT against the standard VAT rate irre-
spective of the objective characteristics of the underlying transaction. In this con-
text, the thesis concludes that following the principle of proportionality, the charg-
ing of (undue) VAT by the taxable person should be allowed (and not be 
sanctioned) in case he has exploited, in all reasonability, all of the available alterna-
tive courses of action which would potentially have allowed him to resolve or pre-
vent the asymmetry and to apply VAT in line with the legal requirements. In such 
situations, the taxable person may attempt to mitigate the risk of legal implications 
associated with the asymmetry (i.e. material VAT corrections and sanctions) by 
charging VAT. 
The principle of proportionality also relates to the area of sanctions. In this 
context, the principle implies that they must serve the correct levy of VAT and 
should be graduated according to the gravity of the infringement. An asymmetry 
should therefore not imply a sanction in case the taxable person, because of the 
asymmetry, has misapplied or missubstantiated VAT where he has acted in good 
faith and has done everything which could reasonably be expected from him. In 
such instances, the imposition of a sanction does not promote the correct levy of 
VAT (and thus does not serve a legitimate purpose), simply because the taxable 
person, with or without a sanction, was unable to apply and substantiate VAT in 
line with the objective characteristics of the transaction and the applicable legal 
requirements. In contrast, in case a taxable person (or his transaction counterpart) 
has acted in bad faith or did not exert reasonable efforts to resolve or prevent the 
asymmetry, the principle of proportionality supports the imposition of sanctions 
on that person to promote the correct levy of VAT. 
19.6. PART V: TAX INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE NORMS OF 
TAXATION 
Part V of the thesis has studied the substantive norms of taxation in connection 
with the tax information position of the taxable person. The substantive norms of 
taxation are the material legal norms and conditions which determine and prescribe 
the application of VAT. 
As a first element, Part V of the thesis addressed the research question to what 
extent positive EU VAT law implies the risk of horizontal tax information asym-
metries and any associated unjustified legal implications for the taxable person. 
The reason for this research question is that asymmetries and the associated legal 
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implications are not academically or practically relevant if their occurrence is mere-
ly a hypothetical or marginal phenomenon with regard to positive EU VAT law. 
Research question III: To what extent does positive EU VAT law imply the risk of 
horizontal tax information asymmetries and any associated unjustified legal implications for 
the taxable person? 
As regards the above research question, the thesis concludes that the materializa-
tion of asymmetries is a real possibility – as evidenced by the sizeable body of 
CJEU case law which deals with frustrated access to external tax information. Es-
pecially the substantive norms underlying the place of supply and the exemptions 
contain elements which make the taxable person dependent on external tax infor-
mation – and consequently expose him to the potential materialization of horizon-
tal tax information asymmetries. These norms have in common that they rely on 
determinants for taxation which are exogenous to the taxable person: transport 
trajectories, locational determinants (e.g. the place of establishment of the custom-
er), even the VAT treatment of transactions carried out by other taxable persons 
(closely linked or related supplies).6 In this context, the thesis further concludes 
that positive EU VAT law provides no adequate legal instruments (e.g. disclosure 
rules which compel transaction counterparts to disclose) or competences (e.g. the 
power to demand disclosure of tax information by transaction counterparts) on 
which the taxable person can rely to resolve or prevent asymmetries. This suggests 
that the taxable person is expected to arrange the procurement of external tax in-
formation on the basis of his commercial interaction with transaction counterparts 
(e.g. by means of contractual agreements). 
Additionally, the third research question relates to the extent to which positive 
EU VAT law implies the risk of unjustified legal implications for the taxable per-
son. Further to the first research question, the thesis has concluded that the legal 
implications of an asymmetry (i.e. material VAT corrections, sanctions) are gener-
ally imposed on the taxable person who, because of the asymmetry, is unable to 
apply and substantiate VAT in line with the objective characteristics of the under-
lying transaction and the legal requirements. In case an asymmetry relates to tax 
information in support of a mere formality (e.g. the requirement to produce a VAT 
identification number), CJEU case law in my view provides solid grounds to avert 
any unjustified legal implications of asymmetries (i.e. material VAT corrections). 
The reason is that with regard to formal infringements, the Court has repeatedly 
                                                     
6 Conversely, substantive norms which relate to the internal organization of the taxable person him-
self (e.g. norms on the taxable person status), or norms which are commonly the product of the 
commercial conclusion of a transaction (e.g. the taxable amount), are less likely to cause horizontal 
tax information asymmetries. 
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prohibited the imposition of material VAT corrections in case the substantive 
requirements of taxation had been met.7 Yet, where an asymmetry relates to tax 
information in support of material conditions of taxation, the CJEU up to now has 
only prohibited the imposition of legal implications in a limited number of judg-
ments. These judgments (i.e. GST - Sarviz Germania, Traum, Euro Tyre, Netto Super-
markt, Teleos and others8) are relatively recent, implying that their legal effect on na-
tional legal orders is a rather novel phenomenon. In addition, these CJEU 
judgments predominantly relate to transactions which take place in an international 
context. In fact, with the exception of Netto Supermarkt, they concern intra-
Community B2B trade. Taking this into account, the Court’s rulings should argua-
bly be viewed merely in light of the ambition of promoting the internal market. As 
regards other sections of EU VAT law (e.g. the place of supply rules, exemptions 
without a right of deduction, reduced VAT rates), CJEU case law on the legal im-
plications of asymmetries is lacking. The circumstance that the CJEU judgments 
on the legal implications of asymmetries are relatively few in number, relatively 
recent, and almost exclusively related to intra-Community trade, supports the posi-
tion that their legal impact on national legal orders is currently still modest. Further 
to this, the thesis concludes that positive EU VAT law cannot with certainty be 
said to fully avert the risk of unjustified legal implications for the taxable person, 
especially not if the asymmetry concerns tax information in support of the material 
requirements of taxation.9  
Part V has further addressed the research question to what extent legal reme-
dies should, with regard to appropriate law, avert the materialization of asymme-
tries for the taxable person. In other words, this part of the thesis concentrates on 
the question whether statutory (EU) VAT law can and should be amended in such 
a manner as to reduce or avoid horizontal tax information asymmetries for the 
taxable person without eroding the current structural elements of the system of 
                                                     
7 E.g. CJEU, 20 October 2016, C-24/15, Plöckl, ECLI:EU:C:2016:791, paragraph 42; CJEU, 15 Sep-
tember 2016, C-518/14, Senatex, ECLI:EU:C:2016:691, paragraph 38; CJEU, 9 July 2015, C-183/14, 
Salomie and Oltean, ECLI:EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 58; CJEU, 11 December 2014, C-590/13, Idexx 
Laboratories Italia, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2429, paragraph 38; CJEU, 1 March 2012, C-280/10, Polski Traw-
ertyn, ECLI:EU:C:2012:107, paragraph 43. 
8 Respectively CJEU, 23 April 2015, C-111/14, GST - Sarviz Germania, ECLI:EU:C:2015:267; CJEU, 
9 October 2014, C-492/13, Traum, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2267; CJEU, 16 December 2010, C-430/09, 
Euro Tyre Holding, [2010] ECR I-13335; CJEU, 21 February 2008, C-271/06, Netto Supermarkt, [2008] 
ECR I-771; CJEU, 27 September 2007, C-409/04, Teleos and others, [2007] ECR I-7797. 
9 I note that the materialization of horizontal tax information asymmetries and their legal implications 
ultimately depends, at least partly, on national law and the manner in which national judiciary and 
public administration institutions carry out their tasks. Since exhaustive research on national legal 
orders was however excluded from the scope of the thesis (refer to section 1.6), I advocate for fur-
ther research on (the legal implications of) horizontal tax information asymmetries on a national legal 
level – particularly in the fields of national VAT law and national administrative law. For further 
reading on this recommendation, refer to section 20.4.2. 
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levying VAT. As such, the thesis thus approaches the phenomenon of asymmetries 
from the perspective of the (EU) legislator, who functions as one of the primary 
addressees of the thesis. 
Research question IV: If horizontal tax information asymmetries can have unjustified 
legal implications for the taxable person, and moreover are a real possibility, in what manner, 
if any, should legal remedies be used to avoid their materialization? 
With regard to the above research question, the thesis firstly established that 
asymmetries cause the taxable person to apply and substantiate VAT contrary to 
the objective characteristics of the transaction and the legal requirements. This is 
connected with various adversities: double taxation, non-taxation, accumulation of 
VAT, adverse selection, differential VAT treatment of similar transactions, and 
conflicts with the ratio legis of provisions of statutory EU VAT law. The mentioned 
phenomena validate the conclusion that the materialization of horizontal tax in-
formation asymmetries should be countered in any justifiable way possible. Fol-
lowing this, the thesis has addressed four categories of legal measures which have 
the potential of remedying horizontal tax information asymmetries and thus pre-
venting the associated adversities: presumptions, disclosure rules imposed on 
transaction counterparts, disclosure rules imposed on the national public authori-
ties, and investigative competences bestowed on the taxable person.  
Research into the above-mentioned legal remedies allows for the conclusion 
that there is no single remedy which holds the potential of perfectly averting hori-
zontal tax information asymmetries in all situations. The structural tenets and legal 
norms of the EU VAT system simply require horizontal exchanges of tax infor-
mation; a circumstance which, by definition, implies the risk of asymmetries. 
Nonetheless, the discussed legal measures do carry the potential of reducing the 
dependency of the taxable person on external tax information and on the willing-
ness of others to disclose. As such, they should be considered whenever legal 
norms have the tendency to maneuver the taxable person into a complex tax in-
formation position. However, the adoption of presumptions, disclosure rules or 
even investigative competences should always be based on a balanced weighing of 
the tax information advantages for the taxable person, the associated administra-
tive burdens, the principles and theoretical ambitions inherent in the system of EU 
VAT, and the protection of privacy and other rights of the transaction counterpart.  
The thesis concludes that presumptions can facilitate the tax information posi-
tion of the taxable person, as they may ‘replace’ norms which rely for their applica-
tion on items of tax information which are difficult to procure. However, a down-
side is that presumptions may erode the principles and theoretical ambitions 
inherent in the system of EU VAT. Disclosure rules imposed on transaction coun-
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terparts can be effective instruments when such persons in practice indeed prove 
to have access to the tax information required by the taxable person. However, 
their adoption necessitates sufficient supervision and enforcement by the national 
public authorities, and they constitute an intensification of the administrative bur-
den of the transaction counterpart. Further, the thesis has concluded that disclo-
sure rules imposed on the national public authorities are less evident remedies. The 
primary reason for this is that the authorities generally do not have timely and 
efficient access to up-to-date tax information on transactions (which may material-
ize on short notice or even change over time). Finally, with regard to the potential 
abuse inherent in them, the instrument of investigative competences bestowed on 
the taxable person should be employed only with the greatest caution – as it holds 
the risk of abuse of powers. 
Further to the third and fourth research questions above, the points below ad-
dress specific conclusions which the thesis has reached for each of the seven cate-
gories of substantive norms which were addressed in Part V. 
Ad 1: Taxable person 
The thesis concludes that the substantive norms underlying the concept of taxable 
person do not imply significant possibilities for the materialization of horizontal 
tax information asymmetries for the taxable person applying and substantiating 
VAT. The primary reason is that the norms are strongly connected with the exis-
tential nature of the taxable person himself, as well as the internal dimension of the 
(economic) activities which he initiates. The possibility of asymmetries between 
members of a VAT group, or between the primary and fixed establishments of a 
taxable person, is likely to be mitigated because of the economic, organization and 
financial links between the mentioned entities. As regards public bodies, the Court 
has ruled that a taxable person who is in competition with a public body and alleg-
es that that body is, in respect of the activities in which it engages as a public au-
thority, treated as a non-taxable person for VAT purposes is entitled to rely on 
article 13 VAT Directive before the national court in order to exact equal treat-
ment. The thesis concludes that national law should provide adequate (legal) in-
struments for the taxable person to procure tax information on the (economic) 
activities of the (potentially competing) public body. 
Ad 2: Taxable transactions 
The thesis concludes that, in connection with the taxable transactions, CJEU case 
law has provided for various substantive norms which in a general sense can be 
said to facilitate the tax information position of the taxable person. The conditions 
of reciprocal performance, stipulation and legal relationship provide a convenient 
foundation for horizontal exchanges of tax information between transaction coun-
terparts. The fact that these substantive norms are conditions for the taxability of a 
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transaction indirectly serves the tax information position of the taxable person, as 
he can rely on the communicative channels which are inherent in the legal relation-
ship, stipulation and reciprocity for the procurement of external tax information. 
A further conclusion is that the norms underlying the taxable transactions only 
imply the possibility of horizontal tax information asymmetries in a limited range 
of situations. The risk predominantly arises when the taxable person structures the 
transaction in such a manner that he externalizes elements which define the occur-
rence of a taxable transaction (e.g. principal-agent relations, consignment and call-
off stock situations). In this context, a notable aspect is that the transfer of the 
right to dispose of tangible property as an owner can follow from the actions of a 
party (agent), rather than from the actions of the taxable person (principal) himself. 
In such situations, the taxable person who effects a taxable transaction for VAT 
purposes (principal) may possibly be subject to an asymmetry vis-à-vis the agent as 
regards the occurrence of the taxable event itself. 
As regards the question to what extent legal remedies (i.e. presumptions, verti-
cal or horizontal disclosure rules) should be employed to avoid or reduce asymme-
tries for the taxable person, the thesis concludes that such measures should be 
used restrictively in the context of the substantive norms underlying the concept of 
a taxable transaction. The reason is that asymmetries in the occurrence of taxable 
transactions can generally be properly averted within the commercial and contrac-
tual context of the taxable transactions themselves. Should parties want to avoid 
asymmetries, the shared contractual basis, which is usually inherent in outsourcing, 
consignment stock and other principal-agent relations, can be employed not only 
to arrange commercial affairs, but also the proper exchange of tax information 
between parties. In case he has delegated or outsourced aspects of the transaction 
(e.g. in principal-agent relations), the taxable person (principal) should aim to con-
tractually arrange with the agent the exchange of tax information on the factual 
occurrence of a taxable transaction, which is often caused by the actions of the 
agent. 
Ad 3: Place of supply 
The primary conclusion in connection with the substantive norms on the place of 
supply is that many of them are based on determinants which are external to the 
organization of the taxable person effecting the supply. This underlines the poten-
tial materialization of horizontal tax information asymmetries. For example, the 
B2B main rule for the place of supply of services depends on, among others, the 
VAT status of the customer, the place of establishment of the customer and the 
potential allocation to a fixed establishment of the customer. The external nature 
of these determinants for the place of supply exposes the taxable person to a real 
possibility of horizontal tax information asymmetries, as well as the associated legal 
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implications which follow from their materialization. The possibility of asymme-
tries is also considerable in relation to the substantive norms of ‘taxable dealer’ 
status (supplies of gas, etc.), the norm of ‘importation’ (supplies of goods trans-
ported from third countries), the norm of the VAT status of the customer (dis-
tance selling and the supplies of services in general), the norm of the ‘place of resi-
dence’ of the customer (various B2C services, relating to very specific details, e.g. 
‘personal and occupational ties’), and the norm of ‘effective use and enjoyment’ 
(various categories of services) or ‘use of the service provided’ by an establishment 
(allocation of B2B main rule services to primary or fixed establishments).  
In a general sense, the thesis concludes that there is a positive relationship be-
tween the risk of asymmetries and the extent to which the place of supply rule 
approximates the actual place of consumption. The reason for this is that place of 
supply rules, which approximate the actual place of consumption, rely to a greater 
extent on external determinants for the place of supply. A contributing factor in this 
regard is that the substantive norms often rely on tax information which is not by 
default disclosed on the basis of the commercial conclusion of the underlying 
transaction. Such items of tax information (e.g. ‘personal and occupational ties’, 
‘use of the service’) are exogenous to the commercial context of the transaction 
and require standalone tax information procurement by the taxable person. Anoth-
er contributing factor is formed by potential (dis)incentives at the level of the 
transaction counterpart. For example, a customer who is aware of the fact that his 
disclosure of tax information leads the taxable person to apply VAT in a certain 
country with a relatively high VAT rate may decide not to disclose at all (or to 
disclose incorrect tax information). In the context of (dis)incentives for disclosure, 
the thesis further underlines that the substantive norms on the place of supply 
contain various determinants which rely on tax information of a potentially private 
or confidential nature. Examples are the place where a non-taxable natural person 
has his permanent address or usually resides, the location and manner of use or 
consumption, and the place where the essential decisions concerning the general 
management of the business are taken. Motivations of privacy and confidentiality 
erode the likeliness that transaction counterparts engage in the horizontal disclo-
sure of tax information. Such circumstances contribute to the materialization of 
asymmetries. 
As regards the question to what extent legal remedies (i.e. presumptions, verti-
cal or horizontal disclosure rules) should be employed to avoid or reduce asymme-
tries for the taxable person, the thesis concludes that such measures should pre-
dominantly rely on either presumptions or horizontal disclosure rules. Vertical 
disclosure rules, which require the disclosure of tax information to the taxable 
person by the national public authorities, are only appropriate when the respective 
tax information is available to the latter (e.g. tax information on the VAT status or 
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place of residence of the customer, if he is a taxable person established in the EU). 
Such rules would however imply a burden for the national public authorities and 
potentially consume public resources which could be employed in a more produc-
tive manner. A more suitable legal remedy is provided by horizontal disclosure 
rules, which would oblige the transaction counterparts to disclose the tax infor-
mation required by the taxable person. However, in case the counterpart is not 
established or residing in the EU, and in case he is a final consumer, the supervi-
sion and enforcement of such rules would be a legally complex and impractical 
affair. In this context, the thesis primarily supports the notion that the EU legisla-
tor should consider presumptions as a legal remedy, as they have the potential of 
relieving the tax information position of the taxable person without being subject 
to the disadvantages associated with vertical and horizontal disclosure rules. For 
example, in connection with the allocation of B2B main rule services to either the 
primary or a fixed establishment, asymmetries as regards the ‘use’ of the service 
can be avoided by adopting the presumption that the services are deemed to be 
provided to the establishment with which the contractual agreements have been 
concluded – possibly coupled with the opportunity to rebut. In relation to the 
VAT status of the customer for distance sales, another example is to adopt the 
presumption that the customer is deemed to be a final consumer (non-taxable 
person) acting as such, unless the latter provides a statement (e.g. via the webshop 
platform, including sufficient supporting tax information) to the contrary. In this 
regard, I note that the VAT Regulation already contains numerous presumptions 
which are specifically aimed at facilitating the tax information position of the taxa-
ble person; even the reliance on the VAT identification number for the VAT status 
and capacity of the customer can effectively be regarded as a presumption for 
these aspects. To the extent that legal remedies are not appropriate to avert the 
materialization of asymmetries, the taxable person should aim to arrange the ex-
change of the required items of tax information (for example, on the ‘use’ of a 
service by a fixed establishment) in the commercial context of the transaction (e.g. 
by specific clauses in the contracts). 
Ad 4: Taxable amount 
As regards the substantive norms underlying the taxable amount, the thesis con-
cludes that they display a strong connection with information which is inherent in 
the commercial context in which transactions materialize. The circumstance that 
the stipulation of the taxable amount is commonly at the center of the mutual 
commercial interactions between transaction counterparts, justifies the general 
conclusion that horizontal tax information dependencies as regards the taxable 
amount are not often significant and that asymmetries are not likely to materialize. 
This is only different when the connections between the reciprocal performances 
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are redirected by means of the intervention of a third party (e.g. third party factor-
ing or payment processing and third party payments). Yet, even in such situations, 
the commercial relationship between the taxable person, who is held to apply and 
substantiate VAT (principal) and the third party (agent), allows for measures which 
reduce or eliminate the materialization of asymmetries (e.g. by contractual ar-
rangements for the exchange of tax information). Since asymmetries in connection 
with the taxable amount are not likely to materialize, the thesis did not elaborate 
on the potential of legal remedies. 
Ad 5: Reduced VAT rates and exemptions 
As regards reduced VAT rates, the thesis concludes that the taxable person effect-
ing the supply may be subject to the possibility of asymmetries in particular when 
he needs to establish the actual use of the good or service by the customer in order 
to determine whether that use is in conformity with the use as required by one of 
the items listed in Annex III to the VAT Directive. Further to the question in what 
manner legal remedies should be used to avoid the materialization of asymmetries, 
the thesis concludes that horizontal disclosure rules imposed on transaction coun-
terparts are not a suitable instrument, as the latter may very well be final consum-
ers – which complicates the supervision and enforcement of such rules. Instead, 
the (EU) legislator could consider, for certain specified products which have dual 
uses (e.g. horses or anti decubitus matrasses), adopting the presumption that the 
respective commodity is not used for the purpose mentioned in Annex III of the 
VAT Directive unless the transaction counterpart provides the taxable person ef-
fecting the supply with sufficient evidence supporting the opposite. This presump-
tion would motivate transaction counterparts with a limited or no right of deduc-
tion to disclose the required tax information to the taxable person. However, it 
would not have such an effect when the transaction counterpart has a full right of 
deduction. Another disadvantage of such a presumption is that it would simulta-
neously require a specification of the items of proof (e.g. copies of slaughter li-
censes or medical affidavits), which would complicate the process of taxation and 
lead to an administrative burden for the transaction participants (including the 
taxable person). The unsuitability of the mentioned legal remedies advocates a 
revision of the interpretation of the substantive norms themselves, so that the 
taxable person effecting the supply is no longer held to establish for each com-
modity whether the actual use is in line with the use as required by Annex III of 
the VAT Directive. 
As regards the exemptions, the thesis concludes that various substantive norms in 
connection with exemptions relate to affairs which are largely external to the taxable 
person effecting the supply, which thus holds the possibility of horizontal tax infor-
mation asymmetries. In particular, the thesis has identified the following norms: 
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• Close links or relations: Various exemptions extend their scope to closely linked 
activities or closely related activities. Such substantive norms can have consid-
erable implications for the tax information position of the taxable person. The 
primary reason is that the VAT treatment of the closely related supply essential-
ly depends on that of the principal supply, holding the possibility of asymme-
tries for a taxable person carrying out only the former. The requirement follow-
ing from CJEU case law that the closely related supply is ‘essential’ for the 
primary supply if it is to fall within the scope of the respective exemption, cre-
ates the need for that taxable person to establish the quality and specifics of the 
primary supply, possibly requiring very detailed tax information which may not 
be accessible. These dependencies are aggravated by the potential circumstance 
that the taxable person has no direct (legal or commercial) relationship with ei-
ther the end customer or the taxable person carrying out the principal supply. 
In such situations, the possibilities for horizontal tax information procurement 
are limited.  
• Transport of goods to certain locations: Statutory EU VAT law contains various exemp-
tions which depend on whether goods are transported to a certain location (e.g. 
to another Member State or non-EU country). Following common commercial 
practice, a taxable person may decide to outsource the actual transport of the 
goods, or delegate it to a transaction counterpart elsewhere in the supply chain. 
By doing so, the taxable person who applies the exemption maneuvers himself 
into a position of horizontal tax information dependency vis-à-vis the person ef-
fecting the transport. Horizontal tax information dependencies especially arise in 
relation to multiple consecutive supplies involving only one incidence of 
transport. In such situations, the (cross-border) transport needs to be allocated to 
one of the supplies. In Euro Tyre, the Court attaches significant weight to the loca-
tion where the transfer of the right to dispose of the goods passes from one 
transaction participant to the other. In case both transfers take place in the Mem-
ber State of origin, the first supply constitutes a local supply of goods. Similarly, 
the second supply is a local supply in case both transfers take place in the Mem-
ber State of destination. In a three-party supply chain, the importance of the loca-
tion of the transfer compels the taxable person, in simplified terms, to obtain tax 
information on 1) the occurrence of both transfers, on 2) the moment at which 
both transfers take place, and on 3) the location of the goods at the moment both 
transfers take place. The possibility of asymmetries in this regard comes down to 
the notion that, in situations involving a supply chain with only one incidence of 
transport and multiple consecutive supplies, the VAT treatment of one supply 
within the supply chain cannot be ascertained without sufficient tax information 
on one or more of the other supplies. Because of the tax information interde-
pendencies between the different suppliers, the allocation of transport demands a 
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supply chain perspective rather than a transactional perspective. Other than lev-
erage following from commercial interrelations, the taxable person has no (legal) 
means available to obtain access to external tax information as regards the specif-
ics of supplies in other stages of the supply chain. This contributes to the materi-
alization of horizontal tax information asymmetries. 
 
Further to the question in what manner legal remedies should be used to avoid the 
materialization of asymmetries in the context of exemptions, the thesis concludes 
that it depends to a great degree on the respective substantive norm. In general, 
however, vertical disclosure rules to be imposed on the national public authorities 
are not an effective legal remedy whenever the respective tax information relates to 
specific transactions – simply for the reason that the authorities do not have time-
ly, efficient or in-depth access to that tax information (e.g. the transport trajectory 
of goods). Similarly, horizontal disclosure rules are often not a suitable instrument, 
in particular not when the transaction counterpart to be burdened with them is 
commonly a final consumer or a transaction counterpart established outside the 
respective Member State. In such situations, the supervision and enforcement of 
such rules would be a legally and practically complex affair. Finally, the thesis con-
cludes that presumptions are also often an unsuitable instrument for the counter-
ing of asymmetries in the context of exemptions. The primary reason is that the 
substantive norms (i.e. the cross-border transport, the allocation of the transport, 
the close links or relations) can hardly be captured in easily accessible items of tax 
information which can be relied upon as a presumption for the transport, its allo-
cation or the close links or relations. The exception to this concerns the VAT sta-
tus and capacity of the customer in relation to the exemption for intra-Community 
supplies of goods: the EU legislator could consider adopting a presumption which 
allows the taxable person to rely on the nature of the goods supplied as a presump-
tion for both the VAT status and capacity of the customer (e.g. when very large 
quantities of (consumer) goods are supplied). To the extent that legal remedies are 
not appropriate to avert the materialization of asymmetries, the taxable person 
should aim to arrange the exchange of the required items of tax information in the 
commercial context of the transaction (e.g. by specific clauses in the contracts). 
Ad 6: Chargeable event, chargeability, liability 
The thesis concludes that the substantive norms underlying the concepts of 
chargeable event and chargeability do not imply significant possibilities for the 
materialization of horizontal tax information asymmetries. The primary reason for 
this is that both aspects in first instance depend on the occurrence of a taxable 
transaction – an event on which transaction counterparts are commonly informed 
(save for exceptional situations involving consignment stocks or principal-agent 
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relations). Also, the exceptions to the main rule of the moment of chargeability (i.e. 
payments on account, issue of the invoice, payment receipt) have no particular 
implications for the tax information position of the taxable person. With regard to 
this, the thesis did not need to address the question in what manner legal remedies 
should be employed to avert the possibility of asymmetries. 
As regards the VAT liability, the thesis concludes that, in particular, the reverse 
charge mechanism is relevant. The reason is that it implies a redistribution of the 
tax information dependencies between the taxable person acting as a supplier and 
the taxable person acting as a customer. In a general sense, the tax information 
needs of the taxable person acting as a customer are intensified. However, in the 
context of the reverse charge mechanism, the thesis concludes that the possibility 
of horizontal tax information asymmetries is limited – in particular because both 
the supplier and customer have a shared interest in the correct application and 
substantiation of VAT. This shared interest constitutes an incentive for the hori-
zontal exchange of tax information; asymmetries can be averted by means of ar-
rangements within the commercial context of the respective transaction (e.g. con-
tractual agreements on the exchange of tax information). Reviewing these aspects, 
the thesis did not need to address the question in what manner legal remedies 
should be used to counter the materialization of asymmetries. 
Ad 7: The right of deduction 
With regard to the right of deduction, the primary conclusion of the thesis is that 
the underlying substantive norms do not imply many significant possibilities for 
the materialization of horizontal tax information asymmetries for the taxable per-
son acting in his capacity as a customer. The condition that supplies are made by a 
taxable person has only a few tax information implications for the taxable person 
acting as a customer – primarily because CJEU case law has restricted the extent to 
which national public authorities can demand the taxable person acting as a cus-
tomer to procure tax information on the identity and VAT status of the supplier. 
Similarly, the condition of ‘use for purposes for which a right of deduction exists’ 
depends on the internal affairs of the taxable person and therefore is not likely to 
lead to the materialization of horizontal tax information asymmetries. Instead, the 
risk of asymmetries for the taxable person in his capacity as a customer primarily 
centers on the procurement of tax information that allows him to establish wheth-
er VAT was charged correctly (i.e. in line with the objective characteristics of the 
transaction), as unduly charged VAT is in principle not deductible. In case he 
wants to rely on the legality of his deduction, the taxable person should do every-
thing which can reasonably be required from him to establish that VAT was indeed 
charged in line with the legal requirements and the objective characteristics of the 
underlying transaction. The thesis concludes that presumptions and vertical or 
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horizontal tax information disclosure rules are not suitable instruments to avert 
asymmetries in this regard. As the correct application of VAT is often (partly) de-
pendent on the disclosures by the taxable person acting as a customer, both trans-
action participants should instead cooperate by mutually disclosing tax information 
in the commercial context of the transaction, with the purpose of achieving a VAT 
treatment in line with the objective characteristics of the transaction. This can be 
achieved by contractually agreeing on the horizontal exchange of tax information. 
